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How Can One Recognize What One Did Not Know? 





In a page of his posthumous book entitled The Visible and the Invisible (1964), the French 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) writes: “As the ethnologist in the face of 
societies called archaic . . . must describe a mythical time where certain events ‘in the beginning’ 
maintain a continued efficacity; so also social psychology, precisely if it wishes to really know 
our own societies, cannot exclude a priori the hypothesis of mythical time as a component of our 
personal and public history”. For Merleau-Ponty it is precisely this mythical time that is evoked 
in the works of Proust and Freud, or in the attention for simultaneity that characterizes modern 
painting. 
On the other hand, one of the most important contemporary specialists in Greek mythology, 
Jean-Pierre Vernant (1914), reminds us that the ancient Greeks called that mythical time aiôn and 
wondered that Mnemosýne—the goddess of memory and the mother of the Muses—could allow 
poets to know that time. 
In his turn, another French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), in his book Difference 
and Repetition (1968) characterizes the mythical time as “a past that was never present” and 
underlines that only reminiscence saves that peculiar past for us, as—in his opinion—Proust has 
taught us. Deleuze reminds as well that the production of reminiscences is due to what Proust 
called “involuntary memory” and Deleuze qualifies this latter as a “passive synthesis” that he 
baptizes precisely with the name Mnemosýne. Actually, not differently from the Greeks in their 
archaic epoch, Deleuze characterizes Mnemosýne as the reverse of Léthe rather than its opposite, 
and precisely in their chiasm he indicates the roots of that very creativity thanks to which 
Mnemosýne was supposed to be the mother of the Muses. In this light, Deleuze describes 
Mnemosýne as the human faculty that—in its intimate and creative link with forgetting—
passively elaborates the essences (or the “ideas” according to the Greek acceptation of this word) 
of our lived experiences and that puts (“retro-jects”) those essences in that mythical time of “the 
beginning” that turns out to be “a past that was never present”.  
Thus, Deleuze judges this characterization as non-platonistic and, in the second edition (1970) 
of his book entitled Proust and Signs, he claims that Proust elaborated “a totally new or modern 
concept of reminiscence”.  Deleuze suggests as well a parallelism between this modern concept 
of reminiscence and the modern art attempts as non-mimetic—both considering essences or ideas 
not as points of departure for their creative elaborations but rather as points of arrival—and 
therefore raises also the crucial question of the meaning of recognition according to this 
perspective. Particularly, it is in this way that Deleuze characterizes a certain form of modern 
painting that links, in his opinion, Cézanne to Francis Bacon, in his book entitled Francis Bacon: 
The Logic of Sensation (1981). 
